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Section 25(2) of the Constitution provides that property may expropriated only in terms of law of 
general application for a public purpose or in the public interest, subject to compensation. Section 
25(3) provides further that the amount of compensation, and the manner and time of payment, must be 
just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interest of those 
affected, having regards to all relevant circumstances, including, inter alia, the purpose of the 
expropriation (s 25(3)(e)).  
 
Academic commentators such as Du Plessis have argued that these provisions implicitly provide for 
compensation below market value or nil compensation (so-called “compensation without 
expropriation”) where the purpose of an expropriation is a constitutionally special one, such as land 
reform. In light of this fact, they argue further, it is unnecessary to amend section 25 to explicitly 
provide for compensation below market value or nil compensation (see E du Plessis “The public 
purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E Marias 
(eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 376).  
 
While this argument was adopted by the Land Claims Court in Msiza v Director-General Department 
of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC), it appears to have been rejected, at 
least implicitly, by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA). The 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal thus appears to support the decision taken by the National 
Assembly to amend section 25 of the Constitution to authorise expropriation of land for land reform 
purposes in those circumstances identified in an Act of Parliament. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyse the manner in which the Supreme Court of 
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The land question is a very emotive one in South Africa. This is because the history of land in South 
Africa is largely a history of dispossession. This history deprived black South Africans, not only of 
their land but also of their dignity, their homes, their livelihoods and their sense of belonging and way 
of life. These consequences were eloquently captured by Sol Plaatjie in his book Native Life in South 
Africa when he stated that following the enactment of the Native Land Act of 1913, “the South African 
native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth”.1 
 
Given this history, it is not surprising that section 25 of the Constitution2 does not only protect the right 
to private property. In addition, it also establishes a constitutional framework for an extensive 
programme of land reform and imposes an obligation on the state to take positive steps to give 
legislative and administrative effect to this programme. The protection of private property is set out in 
section 25(1) to (3) of the Constitution, while the constitutional framework for land reform is set out 
in sections 25(4) to 25(8).  
 
Sections 25(1) to (3) read as follows:  
 
“(1)  No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property 
(2)  Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application: 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been 
agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.  
(3)  The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances, including:  
(a) the current use of the property; 
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;  
 
1 ST Plaatjie Native Life in South Africa (2007) at 21. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the “Constitution”).  
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(c) the market value of the property; 
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the 
property; and  
(e) the purpose of the expropriation”. 
 
And sections 25(4) to (8) read as follows: 
 
“(4)  For the purposes of this section: 
(a) the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable 
access to all South Africa’s natural resources; and  
(b) property is not limited to land.  
(5)  The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions 
which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.  
(6)  A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to 
comparable redress.  
(7)  A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws 
or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to 
equitable redress.  
(8)  No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, 
water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure 
from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1).  
(9)  Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).” 
 
In order to give legislative and administrative effect to the land reform provisions of section 25, 
Parliament has passed a wide range of statutes over the past twenty years. These include the Provision 
of Land and Assistance Act;3 the Restitution of Land Rights Act;4 the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act;5 the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act;6 the Communal Property Associations Act;7 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act;8 and the Communal Land Rights Act.9  
 
3 126 of 1993. 
4  22 of 1994 (hereafter the “Restitution Act”). 
5  2 of 1996 (hereafter the “LTA”). 
6 31 of 1996 (here after the “IPILAR”). 
7 28 of 1996 (hereafter the “CPA”). 
8 62 of 1997 (hereafter the “ESTA”) 
9 11 of 2004 (hereafter the “CLARA”). This Act was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2010 (see 
Tongoane v National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC)). 
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Despite taking these steps, it is generally accepted that the land reform programme has not been as 
successful as it could have been. In its Final Report, for example, the Presidential Advisory Committee 
on Land Reform and Agriculture states that the land reform programme has failed to establish “a new 
generation of sustainable household, small scale and commercial black farmers”.10 It points out in this 
respect that between 1994 and 2018, the state redistributed less than 10% of all commercial farmland 
and that this figure falls far below the state’s initial target of redistributing 30% of all commercial 
farmland by 1999.11 
 
Apart from confirming that the land reform programme has not been successful, the Presidential 
Advisory Committee on Land Reform and Agriculture has also identified many of the reasons for this 
sad state of affairs. These include “a dearth or absence of security of tenure, a lack of transfer of title 
deeds of the acquired portions of land to beneficiaries and poor post-settlement support”.12 At the heart 
of the problem, the Presidential Advisory Committee states further, “is the poor capability of the state 
which is characterised by deficient coordination, limited and misaligned allocated resources (both 
public resources and private resources, particularly the finance sector) and further complicated by 
corruption”.13 
 
The poor capability of the state, the Presidential Advisory Committee goes on to state, also extends to 
inefficiencies in the process of land acquisition and the systematic challenges faced in pre- and post-
settlement support that results in the collapse of land reform schemes. Other problems relate to poor 
land administration “that exacerbates problems of tenure in communal and peri-urban areas, resulting 
in a large portion of the population not being registered and therefore excluded from effectively 
participating in the mainstream economy”.14 
 
 
10 Presidential Advisory Committee on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report May 2019 at 11. See also the High 
Level Panel on the Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change Final Report November 
2017 at 202. See also L Ntsebenza “Land redistribution in South Africa: The property clause revisited” in L Ntsebenza 
and R Hall (eds) The Land Question in South Africa: The challenge of transformation and redistribution (2007) 107 at 
119. 
11 Presidential Advisory Committee on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report May 2019 at 12.  
12 Presidential Advisory Committee on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report May 2019 at 11 
13 Presidential Advisory Committee on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report May 2019 at 11.  
14 Presidential Advisory Committee on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report (May 2019) at 11.  
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Besides these reasons, some local academic and local political commentators have argued that failure 
of land reform programme may also be traced back to section 25 of the Constitution and, especially 
section 25(2)(b) which provides that property may be expropriated only subject to compensation.15 
This requirement, they argue further, does not only make it difficult for the state to acquire land for 
land reform purposes in a cost-effective manner, but also legitimizes and rewards the colonial and 
apartheid dispossession of land. It thus frustrates the redistribution of land and the restoration of dignity 
of black South Africans. It “rubs salt in the wound”.16 
 
Although this argument is contentious,17 it was adopted by the Constitutional Review Committee in 
2018.  The Review Committee recommended that section 25 of the Constitution should be amended 
to explicitly provide for expropriation without compensation as a legitimate option for land reform. 
They contended that this would address historic wrongs, ensure equitable access to law and empower 
the majority of South Africans to participate in the ownership of land.18 Similarly, the Ad Hoc 
Committee adopted this argument to Amend Section 25 of the Constitution in 2019. They 
recommended that section 25 of the Constitution must be changed. Consequently, a Draft Bill was 
published. The Bill provides for amendment of section 25 of the Constitution to explicitly provide that 
where land is expropriated for the purposes of land reform, the amount of compensation may be nil.19 
Instead of blaming the failure of the land reform programme on section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, 
however, other local commentators have argued that it should be blamed on the state's reluctance to 
 
15 See, for example also L Ntsebenza “Land redistribution in South Africa: The property clause revisited” in L Ntsebenza 
and R Hall (eds) The Land Question in South Africa: The challenge of transformation and redistribution (2007) 107 at 
119. Also, see the motion introduced by the EFF in the National Assembly, National Assembly of the Republic of South 
Africa Minutes of Proceedings 27 February 2018 on page 8. 
16 See, for example, Black First Land First Written Submission to Parliament on Review of the Land Clause of the 
Constitution (June 2018) and Foundation for Human Rights Submission to the Constitutional Review Committee 
(November 2018). See also African National Congress Report on the Possible Review of Section 25 of the Constitution 
(November 2018) and Economic Freedman Fighters Report on the Review and Amendment of Section 25 of the 
Constitution (November 2018). 
17 See, for example, the South African Human Rights Commission Submission to the Joint Constitutional Review 
Committee regarding Section 25 of the Constitution (June 2018); Slade et al Submission to Parliament on the review of 
section 25 of the Constitution (September 2018); and Du Plessis Submission to Parliament’s Constitutional Review 
Committee on Land Expropriation Without Compensation (September 2018). 
18 Joint Constitutional Review Committee Report on the possible review of section 25 of the Constitution (November 
2018) at par 7. 
19 Draft Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill. Clause 1 of this Bill amends section 25(2)(b) by adding a proviso. This 
proviso reads as follows: “Provided that in accordance with subsection (3A) a court may, where land and any 
improvements thereon are expropriated for the purposes of land reform, determine that the amount of compensation is 
nil”. Subsection 3A goes on to provide that “[n]ational legislation must, subject to subsections (2) and (3), set out specific 
circumstances where a court may determine that the amount of compensation is nil”.  
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rely on the provisions of sections 25(2) and 25(3).20 If the state had based its approach to acquiring 
land for land reform purposes at least partly on expropriations, rather than entirely on the principle of 
a willing-seller/willing-buyer, it is very unlikely that the courts would have adopted a reactionary 
jurisprudence and put obstacles in the way of such an approach. This is because section 25(3) implicitly 
authorises compensation below market value and, in an appropriate case, nil compensation.21  
 
While this last argument may be correct in theory, the courts do not always appear to be willing to 
accept it in practice.22 In its recent judgment in Uys NO v Msiza,23 for example, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal refused to accept that compensation below market value should be awarded to the landowner 
in question, even though his land was expropriated for the purposes of implementing the LTA. Instead, 
it awarded the landowner the market value of the land as compensation. The approach adopted in this 
judgment, therefore, may provide a strong argument in favour of amending section 25 of the 
Constitution to explicitly provide for compensation below market value or nil compensation in the 
context of land reform as envisaged by the Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill.24    
 
The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, is to critically analyse the manner in which the Supreme 
Court of Appeal interpreted and applied section 25(3) of the Constitution in Uys NO v Msiza in light 
of the argument that the Constitution implicitly provides for compensation below market value or nil 
compensation where the purpose is a constitutionally special one, such as land reform. In particular, 
the purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyse the weight the Supreme Court of Appeal attached 
to the land reform purpose of an expropriation and whether this may or should justify an award of 
compensation below market value or even nil compensation. 
 
 
20 See, for example, Serjeant-at-Bar “Tardiness, not Constitution, to blame for land crises” 13 March 2018 Mail and 
Guardian 28. See also Land and Accountability Research Centre Submission to Parliament’s Joint Constitutional Review 
Committee with respect to the review of section 25 of the Constitution (June 2018) and Socio-Economic Rights Institute 
Note on Expropriation (November 2018). 
21 See, for example, Serjeant-at-Bar “Tardiness, not Constitution, to blame for land crises” 13 March 2018 Mail and 
Guardian 28. See also Land and Accountability Research Centre Submission to Parliament’s Joint Constitutional Review 
Committee with respect to the review of section 25 of the Constitution (June 2018) at 22 and Socio-Economic Rights 
Institute Note on Expropriation (November 2018). 
22 See, for example, J Lorenzen “Compensation at market value for land reform? A critical assessment of the MalaMala 
judgment’s approach to compensation for expropriation in South Africa” 2014 Recht in Afrika – Law in Africa – Droit en 
Afrique 151. 
23 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA). 
24 Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill, 2019 
6 
 
1.2. The research question 
 
As noted above that the purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyse the manner in which the 
Supreme Court of Appeal interpreted and applied section 25(3) of the Constitution in Uys NO v Msiza 
in light of the argument that the Constitution implicitly provides for compensation below market value 
or nil compensation where the purpose is a constitutionally special one, such as land reform.  
 
More particularly, the purpose of this dissertation is to: 
(a)  discuss the manner in which the courts have interpreted and applied the provisions of section 
25(3) of the Constitution prior to Uys NO v Msiza;  
(b) discuss the argument that the Constitution implicitly provides for compensation below market 
value or nil compensation where the purpose is constitutionally special; 
(c) set out and discuss the manner in which the Supreme Court of Appeal interpreted and applied 
the provisions of section 25(3) in Uys NO v Msiza; and 
(c)  critically analyse the judgment in Uys NO v Msiza in light of the argument that the land reform 
is a constitutionally special purpose which justifies compensation below market value or nil 
compensation. 
 
1.3. The purpose of the study 
 
The land debate in South Africa has polarised the nation and made policy direction to be ambivalent. 
Also, the debate has put section 25 of the Constitution into a spotlight where it is either glorified or 
demonised for the South African land reform initiatives.25 This study is significant because it will 
contribute to this current debate and hopefully contribute to the policy direction in South Africa.  
 
The study is conducted at the peak of land debate and compensation of expropriated land is at the 
centre of the whole debate. Despite the Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill which intends to 
 
25 See, for example, Afriforum Submission to the Parliament Constitutional Review Committee and BLF Submission to 
the Parliament Constitutional Review Committee (5 September 2018). See also Oriana Submission to the Parliament 
Constitutional Review Committee (5 September 2018). 
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explicitly provide for a nil compensation with regards of expropriation for land reform purposes,26  it 
is still important to analyse section 25(3) of the Constitution to see how the courts have interpreted it. 
      
1.4. The research methodology 
       
This is a qualitative study. The study critically answers the research questions by collecting, 
investigating and analysing primary and secondary legal sources. The analysis and investigation 
identify the contradictions, inconsistencies, controversies, gaps and the degree of court’s shift towards 
transforming its constitutional interpretation of property clause. Therefore, the primary and secondary 
sources that are analysed are books, chapters in books, journal articles, statutes, internet websites and 
cases that will enhance the argument. 
 
1.5. The structure of the study 
 
This dissertation consists of six chapters. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
The background to the study is set out in Chapter One. Apart from the background, this chapter also 
includes the research questions, the purpose of the study, the research methodology and the structure 
of the study  
 
Chapter Two: The two-stage approach 
The manner in which the courts have interpreted and applied the factors listed in section 25(3) of the 
Constitution prior to the judgment in Uys NO v Msiza is set out and discussed in this chapter. This 
chapter focuses specifically on the relationship between “market value” (paragraph (c)) and the other 
section 25(3) factors. 
 
 Chapter Three: The purpose of the expropriation 
While Chapter Two focuses in the relationship between market value and the other section 25(3) 
factors, this chapter focuses on the “purpose of the expropriation” (paragraph (e)) and whether a 
 
26 The Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill, 2019 
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constitutionally special purpose such as land reform justifies below market value compensation or nil 
compensation. 
 
Chapter Four: The pre-Msiza academic commentary 
The academic arguments in favour of recognising land reform as a constitutionally special purpose 
prior to the Msiza judgments are set out and discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
Chapter Five: The Msiza judgments 
The judgment of the Land Claims Court in Msiza v Director-General of the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform27 and the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Uys 
NO v Msiza28 are set out and discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion and analyses 
  
 
27 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA). 
28 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC). 
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The purpose of this and the next chapter is to set out and discuss the manner in which the courts 
interpreted and applied section 25(3) of the Constitution prior to the judgments in Msiza v Director-
General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform29 and Uys NO v Msiza Others30 
(the Msiza judgments). Although they overlap, a distinction may be drawn between those pre-Msiza 
cases which focused on “market value” (paragraph (c)) and its relation to the other factors listed in 
section 25(3) of the Constitution and those which focussed on the “purpose of the expropriation” 
(paragraph (e)) and whether the purpose justifies compensation below market value. 
 
The first category of cases includes Khumalo v Potgieter31 and Ex parte Former Highlands Residents: 
In re Ash v Department of Land Affairs32 and will be discussed in this chapter. The second category 
include Du Toit v Minister of Transport33 and Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform34 and will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
The two Msiza judgments will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
2.2 Khumalo v Potgieter  
 
2.2.1 The facts 
In this case, the applicants, who were labour tenants, applied in terms of the LTA for an award of the 
land they were entitled to occupy in accordance with their labour tenancy agreement.  The LTA 
provides in this respect that a labour tenant is entitled to apply to the Director-General of the 
Department of Land Reform for ownership of the land he or she occupies and uses in terms of the 
 
29 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC). 
30 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA). 
31 [2000] 2 ALL SA 456 (LCC). 
32 [2000] 2 ALL SA 26 (LCC). 
33 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). 
34 [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 2012). 
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labour tenancy agreement.35 In addition, it also provides that if the labour tenant’s application is 
successful, the state must expropriate the land and pay “just and equitable compensation” to the land 
owner as prescribed by section 25(3) of the Constitution.36 
 
After submitting their application, the applicants entered into a deed of settlement with the defendant, 
who was the owner of the land. Apart from the award of land itself, the deed of settlement provided 
that the defendant should be paid compensation in the amount of R1.2 million. The deed of settlement 
was then referred to the Director-General of the Department of Land Affairs (as it was then known) 
for approval. The Director-General, however refused to do so on the grounds that the amount of 
compensation was not just and equitable because it was excessive. 
 
Acting in terms of the LTA, the Director-General then referred the deed of settlement to the Land 
Claims Court so that it could determine an amount of compensation that was just and equitable. One 
of the key questions the Court had to answer, therefore, is what is meant by the concept of “just and 
equitable compensation”. 
 
2.2.2 The reasoning of the court 
The Land Claims Court agreed with the Director-General and found that the amount agreed on by the 
applicants and the defendant was not just and equitable. Instead of R1.2 million, the Court awarded 
the defendant an amount of R400 000. 
 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Land Claims Court began by very briefly referring to international 
and comparable foreign law. In both of these sources of law, the Court held, “there is widespread 
equation of the concept of just compensation for expropriation with market value compensation.”37 
Academic commentators have also argued that just and equitable compensation should usually be 
market value compensation, unless the other factors listed in section 25(3) required an upward or 
downward adjustment.38  
 
35 Section 16. 
36 Section 23. 
37 Khumalo v Potgieter [2000] 2 ALL SA 456 (LCC) at para 19 
38 Khumalo v Potgieter [2000] 2 ALL SA 456 (LCC) at para 23. 
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In light of these arguments, the Land Claims Court held further, it would determine the amount of just 
and equitable compensation using a two-stage approach. During the first stage, the Court would 
determine the market value of the expropriated property using the principles that have been adopted 
by the courts in the past in order to calculate compensation for expropriation. During the second stage, 
the Court would determine whether the market value needed to be adjusted in light of the other factors 
listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution.39   
 
After setting out these principles, the Land Claims Court turned to apply them to the facts. In this 
respect, the Court began by determining the market value using the comparable sales method. After 
doing so, the Court considered whether it should be adjusted in light of the other factors. In this respect, 
the Court took into account only two of the other factors, namely the “current use of the property” 
(paragraph (a)) and the “history of the acquisition and use of the property” (paragraph (b)).  
 
Insofar as the current use of the property was concerned, the Land Claims Court held that the fact that 
the property was occupied by labour tenants and that they were required to provide labour to owner 
conferred a slight benefit on the land. The market value, therefore, should be adjusted slightly 
upwards.40 Insofar as the history of the property was concerned, the Court held that the fact that the 
labour tenants could not be evicted and were entitled to claim ownership of the land imposed a 
significant burden on it. The market value, therefore, should be adjusted significantly downward.41 
 
Taking all of these considerations into account, the Land Claims Court held that it would be just and 
equitable to award the defendant R400 000.42 
 
2.3 In re Ash v Department of Land Affairs 
 
2.3.1 The facts 
In this case the applicants applied for the restitution of land rights in terms of the Restitution Act in the 
form of monetary compensation and not actual restoration. The applicants, who were all classified as 
 
39 Khumalo v Potgieter [2000] 2 ALL SA 456 (LCC) at para 23. 
40 Khumalo v Potgieter [2000] 2 ALL SA 456 (LCC) at para 94. 
41 Khumalo v Potgieter [2000] 2 ALL SA 456 (LCC) at para 95. 
42 Khumalo v Potgieter [2000] 2 ALL SA 456 (LCC) at para 100. 
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blacks or coloureds during the apartheid era. They based their claim on the ground that they had been 
forced to sell the land they owned after the area in which they were located was declared a white group 
area in 1958.43 
 
After the applicants lodged their claims with the Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights, they 
were referred to the Land Claims Court for resolution. In the Land Claims Court, the Department of 
Land Affairs accepted that the applicants satisfied the requirements of section 2(1) of the Restitution 
Act. This section provides that a person is entitled to restitution of a right of land if he, was 
“dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices.”44 
 
The Department, however, argued that the claimants did not satisfy the requirements of section 2(2) of 
the Restitution Act. This section provides that a person is not entitled to restitution if “just and equitable 
compensation in section 25(3) of the Constitution or any other consideration which is just and 
equitable, calculated at the time of any dispossession of such right, was received in respect of such 
dispossession.”45 The applicants did not satisfy the requirements of section 2(2), the Department 
argued further, because they had been paid for their land at the time they were dispossessed. 
 
2.3.2 The reasoning of the court 
The Land Claims Court found that while some of the applicants had received just and equitable 
compensation at the time they were dispossessed, others had not. This meant that some of the applicants 
were not entitled to restitution of their rights in land in the form of monetary compensation, while 
others were. In arriving at this decision, one of the key questions that Court had to answer was, what 
is meant by the concept of just and equitable compensation in section 25(3) of the Constitution?  
 
In this respect, the Land Claims Court began by carefully examining the approach followed in 
comparable foreign jurisdictions, such as Australia, Germany, Malaysia, Switzerland, the United States 
and the European Union. In all of these jurisdictions just and equitable compensation is usually 
 
43 The land in question was located in the Highlands township which itself was located near to Pretoria. This township 
was declared to be a white group area in terms of the Group Areas Act 69 of 1955 (paras 39-44). 
44 Section 2(1). 
45 Section 2(2). 
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considered to be the market value of the expropriated property, calculated on the date of the 
expropriation.46 
 
Unlike the approach followed in foreign jurisdictions, the Land Claims Court held, market value is 
only one of the factors that has to be taken into account when determining just and equitable 
compensation in South Africa. Apart from market value, the other factors listed in section 25(3) of the 
Constitution must also be taken into account. Given, however, that “market value” (paragraph (c)) and 
the “extent of direct state investment and subsidy” (paragraph (d)) are the only factors which are 
“readily quantifiable”, a two-stage approach should be adopted.47 
 
In terms of this two-stage approach, the Land Claims Court held further that the market value of the 
land should be determined first. Once the market value had been determined, the other factors should 
be taken into account. In light of these other factors, a court must then adjust the amount of market 
value either upward or downward in order to arrive at an amount of compensation that is just and 
equitable.48 
 
After setting out these principles, the Land Claims Court turned to apply the two-stage approach to the 
facts. In this respect, however, the Court based its decision simply on the market value of the land. 
This is because none of the parties led any evidence in respect of the other factors listed in section 
25(3) of the Constitution. Without such evidence it was impossible to know whether the market value 
should be adjusted either upwards or downwards. The Court, therefore, refused to do so.49 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the Land Claims Court also suggested, without actually deciding, 
that the onus of proving that the claimant did not receive just and equitable compensation and, 
therefore, was entitled to claim restitution of a right in land fell onto the claimant and not the landowner 
or the state.50 
 
46 Ex parte Former Highlands Residents: In re Ash v Department of Land Affairs [2000] 2 All SA 26 (LCC) at paras 7-
32. 
47 Ex parte Former Highlands Residents: In re Ash v Department of Land Affairs [2000] 2 All SA 26 (LCC) at para 34. 
48 Ex parte Former Highlands Residents: In re Ash v Department of Land Affairs [2000] 2 All SA 26 (LCC) at para 35. 
49 Ex parte Former Highlands Residents: In re Ash v Department of Land Affairs [2000] 2 All SA 26 (LCC) at paras 77-
75. 




2.4. Academic analysis 
 
Bishop and Ngcukaitobi have criticized the two-stage approach on the following grounds: 
• Market value is not the only factor that can be quantified. The history of acquisition, for 
example, may indicate how the land was paid for and this can be used to determine the 
numerical value of the property.51 
• Market value is “inconsistent with the text of section 25(3)”.52 This is because the goal of 
section 25(3) is “just and equitable’ compensation and not “market value” compensation.53 
• Market value is not objectively determinable. This is because there are different methods of 
valuing property and the manner in which valuers apply these methods may differ.54  
• Where there is dispute in value, it is not easy to extract the other section 25(3) factors from the 




The following points may be made in light of these judgments and criticisms: 
 
First, the so-called “two-stage approach” to determining just and equitable compensation was adopted 
for the first time in Khumalo v Potgieter and confirmed in Ash v Department of Land Affairs. In terms 
of this approach, a court must begin by determining the market value of the property and then adjust 
the market value either upward or downward in light of the other section 25 factors. 
 
 
51 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation” at 9, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
52 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation” at 9, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
53 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation” at 9, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
54 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation” at 9, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
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Second, while the two-stage approach does represent a logical and practical method of determining 
just and equitable compensation by taking into account the section 25(3) factors, academic 
commentators.55 as well as a minority of the Constitutional Court,56 have pointed out that it runs the 
risk of favouring market value over the other section 25(3) factors and thus undermining the intention 
of the drafters of the Constitution. 
 
Third, the risk of favouring market value of the other section 25(3) factors was exacerbated In re Ash 
v Department of Land Affairs where the Land Claims Court held, not only, that it was unwilling to 
consider the other section 25(3) factors in the absence of evidence relating to them, but also that the 
onus of adducing such evidence rests on the claimants.  
 
Fourth, given that it may be very difficult and very expensive to gather evidence relating to the other 
section 25(3) factors and that the claimants in land reform cases will usually be poor, the strict approach 




As the discussion set out in this chapter demonstrates, the pre-Msiza case law focussed initially on the 
relationship between “market value” and the other factors listed in section 25(3) and resulted in the 
adoption of the “two-stage approach”. Although this approach has the benefit of being both logical and 
practical, it also has the potential to favour market value over all of the other section 25(3) factors and 
thus to favour land owners over land claimants, as illustrated in re Ash v Department of Land Affairs. 
Despite these disadvantages, the two-stage approach was adopted by a majority of the Constitutional 
Court in Du Toit v Minister of Transport.57 This judgment is discussed in the next chapter. 
  
 
55 Zimmerman J “Property on the Line: Is an Expropriation-Centered Land Reform Constitutionally Permissible?” 2005 
SALJ 378 at 411 and E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” 
in B Hoops and E Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 378. 
56 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC at para 81. 
57 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). 
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As pointed out above, the purpose of this chapter is to set out and discuss those cases in which the 
courts have focussed on the “purpose of the expropriation” (paragraph (e)) and whether the purpose 
can justify compensation below market value. These cases include Du Toit v Minister of Transport58 
and Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform.59  Each of these 
cases will be discussed in turn. 
 
3.2 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 
 
3.2.1 The facts 
In this case the Road Board occupied the applicant’s land for a period of 18 months and excavated 
80 000 cubic metres of gravel in order to build a public road. In the notice of expropriation, the Board 
served on the applicant, it claimed that it was expropriating the right to “use [the applicant’s] land 
temporarily” in terms of section 8(1)(c) of the National Roads Act.60 Section 8 of the Roads Act61 
provides for “expropriation of land or building material as well as the right to use land temporarily.”62 
This meant, the Board argued, that in terms of section 12(1)(b) of the Expropriation Act,63 it was simply 
required to pay the applicant the value of what he actually lost, namely R6 060.00.64 
 
58 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). 
59 [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 2012). 
60 54 of 1971 (hereafter the “Roads Act”). 
61 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 4. 
62 Section 8(1) of the Roads Act provides that “[t]he Board may, subject to an obligation to pay compensation:  
(a) expropriate land for a national road or for works or purposes in connection with a national road, including any access 
road, the acquisition, mining or treatment of gravel, stone, sand, clay, water or any other material or substance, the 
accommodation of road building staff and the storage or maintenance of vehicles, machines, equipment, tools, stores or 
material;  
(b) take gravel, stone, sand, clay, water or any other material or substance on or in land for the construction of a road or 
for works or for purposes referred to in paragraph (a);  
(c) take the right to use land temporarily for any purpose for which the Board may expropriate such land.”  
63 63 of 1975. 
64 Section 12(1) of the Expropriation Act provides that “[t]he amount of compensation to be paid in terms of this Act to 
an owner in respect of property expropriated in terms of this Act, or in respect of the taking, in terms of this Act, of a 
right to use property, shall not, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), exceed:  
(a) in the case of any property other than a right, excepting a registered right to minerals, the aggregate of:  
(i) the amount which the property would have realised if sold on the date of notice in the open market by a willing seller 
to a willing buyer; and  
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In response, the applicant argued that the Board did not expropriate the right to temporarily use his 
land in terms of section 8(1)(c). Instead, it had expropriated “gravel from [his] land” in terms of section 
8(1)(b) of the Roads Act. This meant, the applicant argued further, that in terms of section 12(1)(a) of 
the Expropriation Act, the Board was required to pay him the market value of the gravel that it had 
taken, namely R801 980.00. In addition, the applicant also argued, the Board was required to pay him 
market value because this was just and equitable as required by section 25(3) of the Constitution. 
 
After the Roads Board rejected the applicant’s argument, he applied to the High Court for an order 
setting its [Board’s] decision aside. The High Court agreed with the applicant and granted the order. 
The Minister then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which upheld the appeal and set the High 
Court’s decision aside. The applicant then appealed to the Constitutional Court. One of the questions 
the Constitutional Court had to answer was how the Expropriation Act, which was passed before the 
transition to democracy in 1994, should be interpreted in light of the provisions of section 25 of the 
Constitution.  
 
3.2.2 The reasoning of the majority of the court 
The majority of the Constitutional Court agreed with the decision made by the Roads Board and 
dismissed the appeal. In arriving at this decision, the majority began by emphasising that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. This means that all laws must comply with its 
.provisions and, more particularly, that all expropriation laws, including the Roads Act and the 
Expropriation Act, must comply with the provisions of section 25 of the Constitution.65 It follows, 
therefore, that the standards set out in section 25(3) are “peremptory and [that] every amount of 
compensation agreed to or decided upon by a court must comply” with them.66 
 
 
(ii) an amount to make good any actual financial loss caused by the expropriation; and  
(b) in the case of a right, excepting a registered right to minerals, an amount to make good any actual financial loss 
caused by the expropriation or the taking of the right:  
Provided that where the property expropriated is of such nature that there is no open market therefor, compensation 
therefor may be determined:  
(aa) on the basis of the amount it would cost to replace the improvements on the property expropriated, having regard to 
the depreciation thereof for any reason, as determined on the date of notice; or  
(bb) in any other suitable manner.” 
65 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 26. 
66 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 28. 
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Given that the provisions of section 12(1)(a) and (b) of the Expropriation Act provide for market value 
compensation and actual financial loss compensation respectively, the majority held, it is clear that 
they differ from the provisions of section 25(3) of the Constitution which provide for just and equitable 
compensation.67 Despite these differences, however, it was not possible to simply bypass the Act and 
rely directly on the Constitution. This is because the applicant did not challenge the constitutional 
validity of the Act. Instead, section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) must be interpreted in conformity with the 
Constitution.68  
 
In this respect, the majority started by pointing out that the factors listed in section 25(3) of the 
Constitution are in “peremptory terms”69 and differ with section 12(1) of the Act.70 However, the 
majority argued further, the “section 25(3) factors do not make it peremptory that all factors listed be 
applied.   Instead, the list is open-ended and factors will be applied only if they are applicable.”71 In 
addition, other factors may also be applied if they are applicable. The goal is to arrive at an amount 
that is just and equitable.72 This means that there may be cases in which market value compensation 
provided for in section 12(1)(a) of the Expropriation Act and actual financial loss provided for in 
section 12(1)(b) will be just and equitable. It also means, however, that there may be cases in which 
these forms of compensation will not be just and equitable.73 
 
In order to ensure that the amount of compensation awarded in terms of section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) 
of the Expropriation Act is always just and equitable, the majority pointed out further, a two-stage 
approach should be adopted. In terms of this approach, a court must first determine the amount of 
compensation that is payable in terms of section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) and then go on to determine 
whether this amount is just and equitable under section 25(3) of the Constitution.74 Although this two-
stage approach was practical, the majority conceded, it was not ideal and it would have been preferable 
if Parliament had amended the Expropriation Act to bring it in line with the Constitution. Nevertheless, 
the two-stage approach did allow the courts to give effect to both the Expropriation Act and the 
 
67  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 28. 
68  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 29. 
69  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 31 
70  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 30 
71  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 33 
72 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 330. 
73  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at paras 32-34. 
74  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 35. 
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Constitution.75 In addition, it was not new and had been adopted by the Land Claims Court in Ash v 
Department of Land Affairs.76 
` 
After setting out these principles, the majority turned to apply them to the facts. In this respect, the 
majority began by finding that the Roads Board was correct. It had not expropriated the applicant’s 
gravel in terms of section 8(1)(b) of the Roads Act, but rather the right to temporarily use the 
applicant’s land in terms of section 8(1)(c).77 This meant, therefore, that the Roads Board did not have 
to pay the applicant the market value of the gravel in terms of section 12(1)(a) of the Expropriation 
Act, but rather his actual financial loss in terms of section 12(1)(b).78 In other words, the Roads Board 
simply had to pay him R6 060.00, provided this amount was also just and equitable in terms of section 
25(3). In order to determine whether it was, the majority went on to consider the factors listed in that 
section. 
 
Insofar as the factors listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution were concerned, the majority considered 
each one in turn, including the purpose of the expropriation. In this respect, the majority held that: 
• the land was not currently being used for the purpose of excavating gravel (factor (a));  
• the land had been bought for the purpose of farming and not excavating gravel (factor (b)); 
• there had been no direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capitalisation of the land (factor (d)); and 
• the purpose of the expropriation was to upgrade a national road which would benefit the general 
public as well as the applicant’s personal and professional needs as a farmer (factor (e)).79  
 
In light of these and other relevant considerations, the majority concluded, that applicant’s actual 
financial loss did amount to just and equitable compensation. It, therefore, dismissed the appeal.80 
 
3.2.3 The reasoning of the minority of the court 
 
75  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 36. 
76  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 37. 
77  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 39. 
78  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at paras 40-45. 
79  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at paras 48-52. 
80  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at paras 54-55. 
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Although the minority also agreed that the appeal should be dismissed, they disagreed with the two-
stage approach adopted by the majority. In this respect, the minority argued that the problem with the 
two-stage approach is that it prioritises the market value over other listed factors and that it “would be 
unwieldy to apply”.81  The two-stage approach also perpetuates the importance of market value at the 
expense of the consideration of other factors of justice and equity.82  
 
3.3 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 
 
3.3.1 The facts 
In this case, the applicants applied for the restitution of land rights in terms of the Restitution Act in 
the form of actual restoration of the dispossessed land. Although both the landowners and the Minister 
of Rural Development and Land Reform accepted that the claim was valid, the landowners and 
especially the Minister argued that it was not feasible to restore the land to the claimants.  
 
The Minister argued it was not feasible to restore the land for the following reasons: first, a world-
renowned eco-tourism destination, known as Mala Mala, had been established on the land; second, the 
market value of the land was R989 057 000; third, the land would have to be expropriated in order to 
restore it to the claimants; and, finally, the state could simply not afford to pay so much money as 
compensation to the land owners.83  
 
In light of these arguments, the Regional Land Claims Commissioner referred the matter to the Land 
Claims Court in order to determine whether restoration of the land itself was feasible. Section 33 of 
the Restitution Act provides in this respect, that when it comes to determining whether restoration is 
feasible, one of the factors a court has to take into account is how much compensation will have to be 
paid for the land. Another factor is whether it would be fair to require the state to pay that amount. One 
of the key questions the Land Claims Court had to answer, therefore, was whether the market value of 
the land was just and equitable? 
 
 
81 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 84. 
82 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) at para 81. 
83 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 at para 10 
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3.3.2 The reasoning of the court 
The Land Claims Court found that the market value of the land would be a just and equitable amount 
of compensation for the purposes of section 25(3) of the Constitution. In arriving at this decision, the 
Court began by noting that in order for compensation to be “just and equitable” it must strike an equal 
balance between “what is given and what was lost”.84 The purpose of compensation, therefore, is “to 
place in the hands of the expropriated owner the full money equivalent of the expropriated property”.85 
 
When it comes to determining what is just and equitable compensation, the Land Claims Court noted 
further that the two-stage approach should be followed. This is because market value is an important 
consideration to take into account.86 In addition, the two-stage approach has been followed, not only 
by the Constitutional Court, but also by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Land Claims Court 
itself.87 
 
After setting out these principles, the Land Claims Court turned to apply them to the facts. In this 
respect the Court began by carefully examining the reports submitted by various expert valuers. 
Following this examination, the Court came to the conclusion that the estimated market value of the 
land together with its improvement was R725 million.88  
 
After determining the market value, the Land Claims Court went on to consider whether it should be 
adjusted in light of the other factors listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution. In this respect, the Court 
examined each factor in turn, including the purpose of the expropriation. Insofar as these factors were 
concerned, the Court held that: 
• the land was used for eco-tourism (factor (a)); 
• the mere fact that the landowners had made a lot of money should not be held against them 
(factor (b));  
• there had been no direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and use of the land 
(factor (d)); and 
 
84 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform) [2012] ZALCC 7 at para 50. 
85 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 at para 51. 
86 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 at para 52. 
87 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 at para 53. 
88 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform) [2012] ZALCC 7 at paras 54-59. 
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• the fact that the purpose of the expropriation was the restitution of land rights did not mean that 
the amount of compensation should be automatically reduced to promote the constitutional 
goals of land reform (factor (e)).89 
 
In light of these points, the Land Claims Court held that none of the other factors listed in section 25(3) 
of the Constitution required the market value to be adjusted upwards or downwards. The market value, 
therefore, was just and equitable. Having decided that the market value was just and equitable, the 
Court went on to conclude that it was not feasible to restore the land because the land claimed by the 




The following points may be made in light of these judgments: 
 
First, in Du Toit v Minister of Transport a majority of the Constitutional Court endorsed the two-stage 
approach, which was originally adopted by the Land Claims Court in Khumalo v Potgieter and 
subsequently confirmed in Ash v Department of Land Affairs.  
 
Second, despite the fact that the expropriation did not serve a special constitutional purpose such as 
land reform, the Constitutional Court awarded the land owner his actual financial loss and not the 
market value of the land. In others words, the Court awarded the land owner compensation at below 
market value.  
 
Third, unlike in Du Toit v Minister of Transport, in Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform the expropriation did serve a special constitutional purpose, namely 
land reform. Despite this fact, the Land Claims Court refused to award the land owner below market 
value compensation.  
 
 
89 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 at paras 60-73. 
90 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 at paras 91-96. 
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Fourth, the weight which the Constitutional Court and the Land Claims attached to the purpose of the 
expropriation in Du Toit v Minister of Transport and Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform respectively has been criticised by academic commentators. While the 
Constitutional Court attached too much weight in Du Toit, the Land Claims Court attached too little in 
Mhlanganisweni Community. 
  
3.5 Conclusion  
 
Apart from the relationship between “market value” and the other factors listed in section 25(3), the 
“purpose of the expropriation” (paragraph (e)) featured prominently in the pre-Msiza case law. As the 
discussion set out in this chapter demonstrates, the manner in which the Constitutional Court and the 
Land Claims Court interpreted and applied this factor, however, is not only confusing, but also 
controversial. It is not surprising, therefore, that these judgments have been criticised by academic 








As pointed out in Chapter Three, the weight which the Constitutional Court and the Land Claims 
attached to the purpose of the expropriation in Du Toit v Minister of Transport and Mhlanganisweni 
Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform respectively has been criticised by 
academic commentators. While the Constitutional Court attached too much weight to the purpose in 
Du Toit, the Land Claim Court attached too little in Mhlanganisweni Community.  
 
These criticisms are based on two arguments, first, that where the purpose of the expropriation is 
constitutional special then compensation at below market value may be justifiable; and, second, given 
South Africa’s history of land dispossession, expropriation for land reform is a constitutional special 
purpose. The arguments may be traced back to an article published in 1998 in the South African Law 
Journal by Professor Jill Zimmerman.91  
 
Some of Zimmerman’s arguments were challenged and others were developed further in an article 
published in the following year in the same journal by Professor Andre Van der Walt.92 More recently, 
the same arguments have also been considered by Professor Elmien du Plessis.93 The purpose of this 




In her article, Zimmerman begins by arguing that the use of the phrase “public interest” in both section 
25(2) and section 25(4) of the Constitution makes it clear that land reform may be implemented at least 
partly through the expropriation of land and, accordingly, that land reform is a legitimate basis for 
 
91 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
at 378. 
92 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay “just and equitable” compensation 
for expropriation’ 2006 SALJ 23. 
93 E du Plessis ‘The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation’ in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 369. See also J Lorenzen 
“Compensation at market value for land reform? A critical assessment of the MalaMala judgment’s approach to 
compensation for expropriation in South Africa” 2014 Recht in Afrika – Law in Africa – Droit en Afrique 151. 
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expropriation.94 Apart from providing a legitimate basis for expropriation, Zimmerman argues further 
that the use of the phrase “public interest” in both section 25(2) and section 25(4) of the Constitution 
also makes it clear that land reform is a factor that must be taken into account when determining just 
and equitable compensation.95An important consequence of these provisions, therefore, is that land 
reform is constitutionally special when it comes to the calculation of just and equitable compensation 
and tips the “compensation balance” in favour of land reform from the very start.96 
 
Zimmerman argued that given that land reform is constitutionally special, the state is entitled to enact 
legislation that includes a series of standardised compensation “discounts”, based on different 
categories of land (although this does not mean that there should be a single, one-size-fits-all, discount 
for every land reform expropriation).97 Although standardised compensation discounts may be applied 
to land reform expropriations, Zimmerman goes on to argue, the amount of compensation paid will 
still have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. This is largely because some of the factors listed 
in section 25(3) of the Constitution are “individualistic in nature, for example, the market value of the 
land and the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the land.”98 
 
Although these two factors are individualistic in nature, the other section 25(3) factors are more general 
in nature. These more general factors can be used to develop and justify standardised, across-the-board, 
compensation discounts for similar cases.99 The “current use of the property”, for example, can be used 
to develop and justify standardised, across-the-board, compensation discounts for those land uses that 
obstruct the public interest, such as land owned for speculative purposes or labour tenants or land that 
is underutilised.100     
 
94 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 406. 
95 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 406. 
96 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 407. 
97 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 407. 
98 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 407. 
99 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 408. 
100 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 408. 
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In summary Zimmerman contends that market value “should not be overstated”. Instead, the 
importance of all the section 25(3) factors should be considered equally.101 Furthermore, she argues 
that there are cases where expropriation is of public interest and is undertaken for land reform where 
expropriation may require nil or minimal compensation.102 She identified categories of land where 
expropriation could be lowered or not paid at all, namely, underutilised or unutilised land, speculative 
land and land expropriated for labour tenants or farmworkers.103 
 
4.3 Van der Walt 
 
In an article published the following year in the same journal, Van der Walt begins by agreeing with 
Zimmerman that land reform is constitutionally special. Apart from the history of land dispossession 
and the economic, political and social role that land plays in South Africa, the structure of section 25 
of the Constitution itself (the juxtaposition of provisions that protect private property and that promote 
land reform) confirms that land reform is constitutional special.104 
 
Van der Walt contends that the mere fact that land reform is constitutionally special, however, does 
not justify the conclusion that the constitutional balance is tipped in favour “of land reform from the 
very start”.105 This is because land reform has already been factored into the careful balance that section 
25 strikes between private interests and the public interest. In other words, because land reform is 
constitutionally special it forms part of the public interest and, as such, has to be balanced or weighed 
against private interests on a case-by-case basis.106 
 
 
101 Zimmerman J “Property on the Line: Is an Expropriation-Centered Land Reform Constitutionally Permissible?” 2005 
SALJ 378 at 411. 
102 Zimmerman J “Property on the Line: Is an Expropriation-Centered Land Reform Constitutionally Permissible?” 2005 
SALJ 378 at 411. 
103 Zimmerman J “Property on the Line: Is an Expropriation-Centered Land Reform Constitutionally Permissible?” 2005 
SALJ 378 at 408. 
104 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
for expropriation” 2006 SALJ 23 at 37. 
105 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
for expropriation” 2006 SALJ 23 at 37-38. 
106 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
for expropriation” 2006 SALJ 23 at 38. 
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The problem with the approach advocated by Zimmerman, Van der Walt argues further, is that the 
purpose of the expropriation by itself, cannot be sufficient on its own to justify the absence or the 
amount of compensation in just the same way that any other single factor by itself, such as market 
value, cannot be sufficient on its own to justify the amount of compensation. Instead, all of the factors 
listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution must be considered together.107 
 
It follows, therefore, Van der Walt concludes, that he does not agree that section 25 of the Constitution 
is “weighted in favour of land reform from the start.”108  In his view, section 25 contains “a very 
delicate and carefully calibrated balance that leaves open the possibility that the scales will be tipped 
in favour of either”109 private or public interests in a specific case. “The courts, therefore, have to 
consider all circumstances carefully in every individual case and then decide how compensation should 
be determined, rather than working on the assumption that the section favours land reform and that a 
blanket discount, therefore, is in order”.110 
 
4.4 Du Plessis    
 
In her more recent contribution, Du Plessis argues that when it comes to determining just and equitable 
compensation it is important to distinguish between the reference to a “public purpose” in section 25(2) 
of the Constitution and the reference to a “public purpose” in section 25(3).111 In her view, the reference 
to a public purpose in section 25(2) is a reference to one of the requirements for a valid expropriation, 
while the reference to a public purpose in section 25(3) is a reference to one of the factors that must 
be taken into account when determining just and equitable compensation.112 She laments the fact that 
 
107 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
for expropriation” 2006 SALJ 23 at 38. 
108 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
for expropriation” 2006 SALJ 23 at 40. 
109 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
for expropriation” 2006 SALJ 23 at 40. 
110 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation 
for expropriation” 2006 SALJ 23 at 40. 
111 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 376. 
112 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 376. 
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the courts “tend to confuse public purpose as a requirement with public purpose as a factor”113 when 
calculating just and equitable compensation and, as a result, have arrived at contradictory conclusions 
which frustrate rather than facilitate the land reform goals of the Constitution.114 
 
This tendency, Du Plessis argues further, is clearly illustrated in Du Toit v Minister of Transportation115 
and Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform.116 In Du Toit the 
Constitutional Court endorsed the High Court decision to award compensation below market value 
even though the purpose of the expropriation was not constitutionally special. It was simply to build a 
national road for public purpose. As a result, the land owner was “unfairly burdened by receiving less 
than market value for an ordinary, run-of-the-mill expropriation”.117 In Mhlanganisweni Community, 
however, the Land Claims Court refused to award compensation below market value even though the 
purpose of the expropriation was constitutionally special, namely to restore land in terms of the 
Restitution Act. As a result, the public interest was unfairly burdened by having to pay market value 
for an expropriation aimed at promoting the land reform goals of the Constitution.118  
 
In both cases, Du Plessis argues, “the requirement that compensation must take place for public 
purpose or in the public interest was misconstrued”.119 Furthermore, she asserts that if the Du Toit 
decision stands, the state will always expropriate resources from private citizens below market value 
for the benefit of general public.120 She emphasises that the upkeep of national asset should be spread 
among all citizens. However, she asserts that market value should not be important in cases where the 
“constitutional imperative to transformation is sought,”121 like in the Mhlanganisweni Community 
 
113 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 377. 
114 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 377. 
115 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). 
116 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform (156/2009) [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 
April 2012). 
117 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 378. 
118 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 378. 
119 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 378 
120 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 379 
121 E du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops and E 
Marias (eds) Rethinking expropriation law I: Public interest in expropriation (2014) at 379 
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case. Her main contention is the confusion of the justification of the public purpose requirement with 
public purpose as a factor in influencing the calculation of compensation.  
 
Like Van der Walt, Du Plessis also argues, that when it comes to determining just and equitable 
compensation the public purpose factor must be “sensitive to the context within which expropriation 
is done.” 122 This means that while there will be cases in which the purpose of the expropriation will 
be reflected in a reduction of compensation, there will also be cases in which it will not be. This is 
because the “legitimacy of the public purpose is not always reflected by the reduction of 
compensation”. 123 
 
Her main argument is that payment of market value would probably be just and equitable where there 
is balance between public interest and the interests of those affected by expropriation, whereas, the 
reduction of market value can be justified when expropriation is for land reform purposes and section 
25(3)(e) can strike the balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected in this 
case.124 She argues that private ownership rights and transformation rights must not compete because 
they are both constitutional imperative. Instead, when compensation is calculated, there has to be 
“balancing and reconciling claims in a just manner”125 as it is done in international jurisprudence. 
 
Finally, Du Plessis also suggests that legislature must provide clear guidelines on calculation of just 
and equitable compensation rather than copy and paste section 25(3) and courts must break away with 




In light of the arguments set out above, the following points may be made: 
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First, given South Africa’s colonial and apartheid history of land dispossession, Zimmerman, Van der 
Walt and Du Plessis all agree that land reform is constitutionally special and that it does not only justify 
the expropriation of land in the public interest, but may/should also justify compensation below market 
value. 
 
Second, given that land reform is constitutionally special, Zimmerman argues that it should tip the 
scale in favour of compensation below market value from the very start. Van der Walt and Du Plessis 
disagree. Van der Walt argues that it should not tip the scale from the very start because land reform 
has already been factored into section 25. Whereas Du Plessis emphasises on striking a balance 
between public interest and the interests of those affected to allow public interest factor to play a critical 
role in reducing the amount of compensation below market value.   
 
Third, in the same way that a constitutionally special purpose such as land reform should not 
automatically outweigh all of the other section 25(3) factors, neither should market value. Instead, all 
of the section 25(3) factors should be weighed together on a case-by-case basis taking into account the 
purpose of section 25(3) of the Constitution and the context of each particular case. 
 
Fourth, according to Zimmerman, the sorts of cases in which a land reform purpose may outweigh the 
other section 25(3) factors and result in compensation below market value include underutilised or 
unutilised land, speculative land and land expropriated for labour tenants or farmworkers. 
 
It is interesting to note that some of these cases are similar to those identified in section 12(3) of   
Expropriation Bill of 2019 as cases where nil compensation may be awarded. The Expropriation Bill 
in section 12(3) provides in this respect that: 
 
“It may be just and equitable for nil compensation to be paid where land is expropriated in the public interest, having regard 
to all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to: 
(a)  where the land is occupied or used by a labour tenant, as defined in the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 1996 
(Act No. 3 of 1996); 
(b) where the land is held for purely speculative purposes; 
(c)  where the land is owned by a state-owned corporation or other state-owned entity; 
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(d)  where the owner of the land has abandoned the land; 
(e)  where the market value of the land is equivalent to, or less than, the present value of direct state investment or 
subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the land”.127 
 
Finally, both Zimmerman and Du Plessis argue that Parliament must intervene and pass an Act which 
not only identifies the circumstances in which compensation below market value may be awarded, but 
which also sets a discounted amount for each category.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
As the discussion set out in this chapter demonstrates, the manner in which the courts and academic 
commentators have interpreted section 25(3) of the Constitution differs significantly. While the courts 
have been reluctant to accept that land reform is a constitutionally specially purpose and as such 
must/should justify compensation below market value or nil compensation, academic commentators 
have not. Instead, academic commentators have accepted the first point as a given and have instead 
focussed on the second, namely whether a land reform purpose should automatically result in a blanket 
discount or not. Following the judgment of the Land Claims Court in Mhlanganisweni Community v 
Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform,128 however, it appeared as though the courts, or at 
least some courts, were now willing to accept that land reform was a constitutional special purpose 
that could justify compensation below market value. Unfortunately, this development proved to be 
short lived when the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the Land Claims Court’s decision on appeal. 
These two judgments are discussed in the next chapter. 
  
 
127  Draft Expropriation Bill, 2019. 
128 [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 2012). 
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Although the argument that land reform is a constitutionally special purpose and may/should justify 
compensation below market value was expressly rejected by the Land Claims Court in 
Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform,129 it was expressly 
adopted by the same court in Msiza v Director-General of the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform.130 When the Land Claims Court’s decision was taken on appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was presented with an opportunity to resolve these conflicting approaches and determine 
whether land reform may/should justify compensation below market value. Although it does not 
expressly state so, the Supreme Court of Appeal essentially supported the approach followed in 
Mhlanganisweni Community and awarded market value. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
Msiza judgments. 
 
5.2 Msiza v Director General for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
 
5.2.1 The facts 
The applicant was a labour tenant on a farm owned by the Dee Cee Trust (the third and fourth 
respondents were the trustees). Apart from the applicant, both his father and his grandfather were also 
labour tenants on the same farm. As the phrase suggests, a labour tenant is a person who provides 
labour to the owner of land in return for the contractual right to occupy a portion of that land together 
with his family and use it to graze cattle and grow crops.131 
 
 
129 [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 2012). 
130 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC). 
131 A labour tenant is defined in section 1 of the LTA as “a person: 
(a) who is residing or has the right to reside on a farm; 
(b) who has or has had the right to use cropping or grazing land on the farm, referred to in paragraph (a), or another farm 
of the owner, and in consideration of such right provides or has provided labour to the owner or lessee; and 
(c) whose parent or grandparent resided or resides on a farm and had the use of cropping or grazing land on such farm or 
another farm of the owner, and in consideration of such right provided or provides labour to the owner or lessee of such 
or such other farm, including a person who has been appointed a successor to a labour tenant in accordance with the 
provisions of section 3(4) and (5), but excluding a farmworker”. 
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Labour tenancy agreements are governed partly by the LTA. One of the goals of this Act is to protect 
the security of tenure of labour tenants by regulating the manner in which they may be evicted.132 
Another goal is to improve the security of tenure of labour tenants by conferring a right on them to 
claim ownership of the land that they have occupied and used in terms of their labour tenancy 
agreement.133  
 
A labour tenant’s right to claim ownership of the land he or she is occupying and using is set out in 
Chapter III of the Act. Chapter III provides in this respect that a labour tenant may apply to the 
Director-General of the Department of Land Reform for ownership of the land he or she occupies and 
uses in terms of a labour tenancy agreement.134 
 
Chapter III goes on to provide that after the Director-General has received the claim, he or she must 
inform the owner of the land. The owner must then indicate whether he or she accepts that the applicant 
is a labour tenant or not. After the Director-General has received the owner’s response, he or she must 
attempt to settle the claim by mutual agreement.135 
 
 
132 See sections 6, 7,9,10 and 11 of LTA 
133 See section 16 of LTA 
134 Section 16. This section reads as follows: “Subject to the provisions of this Act, a labour tenant or his or her successor 
may apply for an award of: 
(a) the land which he or she is entitled to occupy or use in terms of section 3; 
(b) the land which he or she or his or her family occupied or used during a period of five years immediately prior to the 
commencement of this Act, and of which he or she or his or her family was deprived contrary to the terms of an 
agreement between the parties; 
(c) rights in land elsewhere on the farm or in the vicinity which may have been proposed by the owner of the farm; and 
(d) such servitudes of right of access to water, rights of way or other servitudes as are reasonably necessary or are 
reasonably consistent with the rights which he or she enjoys or has previously enjoyed as a labour tenant, or such other 
compensatory land or rights in land and servitudes as he or she may accept in terms of section 18(5): Provided that the 
right to apply to be awarded such land, rights in land and servitudes shall lapse if no application is lodged with the 
Director-General in terms of section 17 within four years of the commencement of this Act:. 
135 Section 17. This section reads as follows: 
“(1) An application for the acquisition of land and servitudes referred to in section 16 shall be lodged with the Director-
General. 
(2) On receiving an application in terms of subsection (1), the Director-General shall: 
(a) forthwith give notice of receipt of the application to the owner of the land and to the holder of any other registered 
right in the land in question; 
(b) in the notice to the owner, draw his or her attention to the contents of this section and section 18; 
(c) cause a notice of the application to be published in the Gazette; and(d) call upon the owner by written request, to 
furnish him or her within 30 days 
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If the Director-General is unable to settle the claim by mutual agreement, he or she must refer it for 
arbitration to an arbitrator or for adjudication to the Land Claims Court. The decision of the arbitrator 
or the Land Claims Court will then be final.136 Once the claim has been finalised, the state must 
expropriate the land and pay just and equitable compensation to the land owner as prescribed by the 
provisions of section 25(3) of the Constitution.137 
 
In this case, the Dee Cee Trust (the “Trust”) denied that the applicant was a labour tenant and the 
Director-General referred the dispute to the Land Claims Court which found in favour of the applicant. 
After the Land Claims Court found in favour of the applicant, the state sought to expropriate the land 
but could not come to an agreement with the Trust on the amount of just and equitable compensation 
that should be paid. 
 
The reason why the state and the Trust could not come to an agreement is because the state argued that 
compensation should be calculated on the basis of the land’s current agricultural use and that its market 
value was R1 800 000, while the Trust argued that compensation should be calculated on the basis of 
the property’s development potential and that its market value was R4 360 000. This dispute was then 
referred to the Land Claims Court for determination. After the parties had led evidence, the Court 
directed them to submit arguments setting out the test to be applied when the amount of compensation 




136 Section 18. This section reads in part as follows:  
“(5) No agreement for the settlement of any application shall be of any effect unless the Director-General has certified 
that he or she is satisfied that it is reasonable and equitable, or unless it is incorporated in an order of the Court in terms 
of this Act. 
(6) The Director-General shall submit any agreement certified by him or her in terms of subsection (5), to the Court. 
(7) If: 
(a) the owner does not submit proposals in terms of subsection (1); or 
(b) the applicant rejects a proposal in terms of subsection (4); or 
(c) the parties reach an agreement but the Director-General is not satisfied that it is reasonable and equitable, the 
Director-General shall, at the request of any party, refer the application to the Court and inform the other parties that he 
or she has done so”. 
137 Section 23. This section reads as follows:  
“(1) The owner of affected land or any other person whose rights are affected shall be entitled to just and equitable 
compensation as prescribed by the Constitution for the acquisition by the applicant of land or a right in land. 
(2) The amount of compensation shall, failing agreement, be determined by the arbitrator or the Court. 
(3) Compensation shall, failing agreement, be paid in such manner and within such period as the arbitrator or the Court 




5.2.2 The reasoning of the court 
 
(a) Introduction 
Insofar as the test to be applied to section 25(3) of the Constitution was concerned, the Land Claim 
Court began its analysis by confirming that market value is not the basis for determining compensation 
in terms of section 25(3). This is because market value is simply one of the circumstances that has to 
be taken into account.138  
 
Furthermore, the court stated that the land owner was not correct when he submitted that the 
jurisprudence of the Land Claims Court has identified market value as the pre-eminent consideration. 
Rather, what the jurisprudence of the Land Claims Court has shown is that market value is frequently 
used as the “entry point” to the analysis.139 
 
The Land Claims Court noted that although market value is frequently used as the entry point of the 
analysis this does not make it the most “important factor”.140 Instead, “[t]he object is always to 
determine compensation that is just and equitable, not to determine the market value of the 
property.”141 It follows, therefore, that compensation which is below market value can be awarded 
provided it is just and equitable.142 
 
(b) The two-stage approach 
After setting out these points, the Land Claims Court shifted its focus to the two-stage approach. In 
this respect, the Court started by pointing out the logic underlying the two-stage approach but went on 
 
138 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
29 
139 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
30 
140  Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
30 
141 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
30 




to state that this should not be misconstrued as “accepting the logic of the two-staged approach”143 
because, just like market value, the other factors listed in section 25(3) and especially paragraph (d) 
are also capable of being easily quantified. Consequently, there is no valid reason to begin with market 
value.144 Despite levelling these criticisms against the two-stage approach, however, the Court 
(somewhat surprisingly) held that it would still apply this method. 
 
(c) Market value 
Having adopted the two-stage approach, the Land Claims Court then turned to consider each stage. In 
this respect, the Court first determined the market value of the land using the “comparable sales 
method”145 and came to the conclusion that it was worth R1 800 000. This was also the amount that 
the state had indicated it was willing to pay.146 The Court then went on to consider each of the other 
factors listed in section 25(3) in turn.  
 
(d) The current use of the property 
Insofar as the current use of the property was concerned, the Land Claims Court pointed out that when 
the Trust bought the affected property it was fully aware of the fact that the applicant was occupying 
and using the land for agricultural purposes. In addition, the Trust was also aware that the applicant’s 
grandfather had lodged a claim for ownership of the land in terms of Chapter III of the LTA.147 





143Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
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(e) The history of acquisition and use of the property 
Insofar as the history of the acquisition and use of the property was concerned, the Land Claims Court 
began by pointing out that this factor is vital in the South African context because it allows a court to 
determine whether the property was acquired below the market value during the apartheid era or not. 
If the property was acquired below market value, it would be unfair to award compensation in a form 
of market value. This is because the owner would benefit twice.150 
 
After setting out these principles, the Court turned to investigate the history of the acquisition and use 
of the property itself. In this respect, it pointed out that the Trust bought the farm in 1999 for 
R400 000.151 Despite paying only R400 000 for the entire 352ha farm, however, the Trust had valued 
the 45ha portion claimed by the applicants at R4 360 000.152  
 
Furthermore, the Court held that although the value of property had undoubtedly appreciated since 
1999, it was very unlikely that it had appreciated to the extent argued by the Trust. In addition, it was 
important to note that the intention of section 25(3) was not “to reward property speculation.”153 This 
meant that “payment in excess of R4m did not reflect the equitable balance between the public interest 
and his interests as required by section 25 of the Constitution.”154 The Court then confirmed that the 
compensation amount must be reduced because, first, the Trust paid less when it purchased the property 
in 1999; second, the Trust was aware of the application for land ownership when it purchased the land; 





150 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
53. 
151 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
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152 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
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153 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
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154 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
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(f) The extent of direct state investment and subsidy 
Insofar as the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property was concerned, the Land Claims Court pointed out that this factor is 
aimed at ensuring that the state does compensate an owner who was subsidised by apartheid 
government to improve the property. This is because the owner would benefit twice. In the case at 
hand, however, that the state had not invested in or subsidised the farm and, consequently, this factor 
was not relevant in this case.156  
 
(g) The purpose of expropriation 
Insofar as the purpose of the expropriation was concerned, the Land Claims Court pointed out that this 
factor is aimed at promoting land reform in South Africa.157 This means that when section 25(3)(e) “is 
read in conjunction with section 25(8) of the Constitution, which directs the state to promote land 
reform,” it follows “that compensation below market value can be paid in land reform cases.”158 The 
inclusion of this factor in section 25(3), thus, “effectively creates a counterweight to market value,” 
which has dominated the process of calculating compensation.159 
 
(h) Application of the factors  
After discussing each factor, the Land Claims Court summarised its findings. In this respect, it held 
that not only was there a disproportionate chasm between the amount the landowner paid to purchase 
the land and the compensation they were claiming, but also that “the landowner had made no 
significant investment in the land and that the use of the land had not changed since it was acquired”.160 
 
In addition, the landowner knew at the time it bought the land that the applicants were living on it; that 
the applicants had been awarded ownership of their portion; and that the purpose of the expropriation 
was land reform and that in such a case the state should not be saddled with an extravagant claim for 
 
156 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
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157 Msiza v Director General of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) at para 
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compensation. 161In light of this summary, the Land Claims Court went on to reduce the amount of 




The following points may be made in light of this judgment: 
 
First, the Land Claims Court levelled a number of important criticisms against the two-stage approach 
and that these criticisms appear to be correct. Despite these criticisms, however, the Court still applied 
the two-stage approach. This seems to undermine its criticisms. 
 
Second, for the first time the Land Claims Court accepted the arguments made by academic 
commentators that land reform is a constitutionally special purpose which may justify compensation 
below market value 
 
Third, even though the decision to reduce the amount of compensation to below market value appears 
to be correct, it is difficult to understand how the Land Claims Court arrived at an amount of R300 000. 
Unfortunately, it did not explain this. 
 
5.4 Uys NO v Msiza 
 
5.4.1 The facts 
After the Land Claims Court handed down its judgment, the trustees of the Dee Cee Trust appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. They based their appeal on the ground, inter alia, that the Land Claims 
Court had arbitrarily reduced the market value of the property by R300 000 simply because the purpose 









5.4.2 The reasoning of the court 
The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the trustees and upheld that appeal. In arriving at this 
decision, the Court began by referring with approval to the two-stage approach adopted by the 
Constitutional Court in Du Toit v Minister of Transport.162 This approach is appropriate, the Court 
stated, not only because it was adopted by the Constitutional Court, but also because market value is 
usually the one factor capable of objective determination. Therefore, it is a convenient starting point 
for determining what constitutes just and equitable compensation.163 This approach, however, must be 
applied with care to ensure that all of the factors set out section in section 25(3) are given equal 
weight.164 
 
After referring to the two-stage approach with approval, the Supreme Court of Appeal turned its 
attention to the market value of the land. In this respect, the Court began by stating that a report 
prepared by the state’s expert valuer was particularly significant. This is because he took into account, 
not only the physical features attaching to the land, but also its historical and present use by the Msiza 
family. Taking all of these factors into account, the state’s expert valuer came to the conclusion that 
the market value of the land was R1 800 000. Given the comprehensive approach adopted by the state’s 
expert value, the Court concluded, his decision could not be faulted.165 
 
Having come to the conclusion that the market value of the land was R1 800 000, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal turned to consider the reasons given by the Land Claims Court for deciding that just and 
equitable compensation should not be the market value of the land, but rather an amount below market 
value, namely R1 300 000. In this respect, the Court started by rejecting the finding that there was a 
“disproportionate chasm”166 between the price paid by the Trust when it bought the land and the market 
value at the time of the determination. The difference in these amounts, the Court held, was simply a 
result of the increase in the value of the land.167  
 
 
162 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at para 10. 
163 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at para 12. 
164 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at para 13. 
165 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at paras 15-16. 
166 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at para 15 
167 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at para 24. 
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Apart from this finding, the Supreme Court then stated that the Land Claims Court also based its 
decision on a number of other grounds. These included the failure of the Trust to make any significant 
investment in the land since its acquisition; the unchanged use of the land; the Trust’s knowledge of 
the impediment to development; the occupation and use of the land by the Msiza family since 1936 as 
labour tenants; and the applicant’s successful claim in terms of Chapter III of the Labour Tenants Act. 
Although all of these factors were clearly relevant, the Court stated further, they had already been taken 
into account by the state’s expert valuer when he valued the property at R1 800 000.168 
 
Given this fact, the Supreme Court of Appeal concluded, there was “no justification for stigmatising 
the Trust’s claim as ‘extravagant’. Nor was there any evidence that the fiscus [was] unable to pay R1,8 
million for the land. In fact, it accepted that the valuation was appropriate” and it was willing to pay 
this amount.169 There were thus no facts to justify the R300 000 deduction, which was consequently 
irrational and arbitrary.170 The appeal, therefore, had to be upheld. 
 
5.5. Academic analysis 
 
Even in cases where the courts have articulated the anti-centrality of market value in determining just 
and equitable compensation, like in Msiza where Ngcukaitobi AJ held that market value was not the 
basis for the determination of compensation but the point of departure is justice and equity,171 
ultimately, the Court applied the two-stage approach which seems to be venerating market value above 
other factors. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Uys NO v Msiza though it confirmed that 
market value is not above other factors listed in section 25(3), the Court nevertheless proceeded to use 
the two-stage approach where market value took precedent over other factors. 
 
Ngcukatoibi and Bishop172 have criticised Msiza decision and argued that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
erred in overturning the Land Claims Court’s decision because: 
 
168 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at para 25. 
169 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at para 26. 
170 Uys NO v Msiza 2018 (3) SA 440 (SCA) at para 27. 
171 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) 
172 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
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• “the Constitution expressly requires all those factors to be considered, knowing that some 
of them would obviously be relevant in the determination of market value.   
• the weight of the various factors must be weighed by the court when it determines what is 
just and equitable, not by the valuer when she determines market value.  Even if the same 
factors are considered, the purpose is different, as is the entity determining the weight.” 173 
 
They strongly argued that this decision buffers the possibility of weighing in other factors which are 
vital in cases of expropriation for land reform purposes, such as history of the property and purpose 
and the purpose of expropriation. 174 Furthermore, they contended that if this decision is not taken on 
review there is a danger to misconstrue just and equitable compensation as market value and the courts 
will be reluctant to rule that is just and equitable to pay nil or lesser compensation. 175  
 
Thus, they put three mechanism that can ameliorate this condition, namely: 
• the Msiza case should be reviewed by the Constitutional Court; 
• new legislation that will explicitly provide “alternative mechanism to calculate just and 
equitable compensation at below market value;”176 and 
• amendment of the section 25(3) of the Constitution to allow payment of compensation below 
the market value in certain instances. 177 (my emphasis) 
 
I agree with this criticism because if Msiza’s logic is allowed to stay, our jurisprudence will be 
impoverished. Therefore, we need legislation that will explicitly provide for compensation below 
 
173 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 10. 
174 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 10. 
175 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 10. 
176 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 10. 
177 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 11. 
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market value or nil compensation. This has become a dominant view that is even captured in the 




The following points may be made in light of these judgments and criticisms: 
 
First, irrespective of whether one agrees or disagrees with the judgment of the Land Claims Court in 
Msiza, it has the merit of critically engaging with some of the complex and controversial issues that 
section 25(3) of the Constitution gives rise and especially the role of section 25(3)(e), the purpose of 
the expropriation. 
 
In this respect, the Land Claims Court judgment stands in marked contrast to the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal which avoids engaging with any of the constitutional issues raised by the 
lower court. Instead, it focuses almost exclusively on the facts. This is very disappointing particularly 
in the context of a constitutional democracy which is based on the value of justification. It also leaves 
the section 25(3) jurisprudence poorer. 
 
Second, although the Supreme Court of Appeal was careful to state that all of the factors set out in 
section 25(3) of the Constitution must be given equal weight and that market value is simply one 
component of a set, it may be argued that an unintended consequence of its judgment is to favour 
market value over the other factors. 
 
This is demonstrated most starkly in the argument that the state’s expert valuer had taken  the current 
use of the property, the history of the acquisition and use of the property and the land reform purpose 
of the expropriation into account when he calculated the market value of the property and that the Land 
Claims Court had accepted this. 
 
The problem with this argument, first, is that it is not clear from the Land Claims Court judgment that 
the state’s expert valuer had in fact taken these factors into account when he calculated the  
44 
 
market value of the property; and, second, even if he did, whether he took them into account in order 
to determine the market value of the property or just and equitable compensation. This argument also 
subsumes these factors under market value and fails to treat them as separate considerations. 
 
Third, while the judgment of the Land Claims Court provides judicial authority for Van der Walt’s 
argument that land reform can justify compensation at less than market value in an appropriate case, 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal essentially rejects this argument. The problem with the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment, however, is that it once again confuses public purpose as a 
requirement for a valid expropriation with public purpose as a factor to be taken into account when 
determining the level of compensation. As Du Plessis has pointed out, the problem with confusing the 
different roles that public purpose plays in each context is that it could frustrate the transformation 




As the discussion set out above demonstrates, with one exception, the courts do not appear to be willing 
to accept that land reform is a constitutionally special purpose and as such must/should justify 
compensation at below market value or nil compensation. The reluctance on the part of the courts to 
accept this point, therefore, may provide a strong argument in favour of amending section 25 of the 
Constitution to explicitly provide for compensation below market value or nil compensation in the 
context of land reform. This argument is explored in more detail in the next and final chapter. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to argue that it is necessary to amend section 25 of the Constitution to 
explicitly provide for compensation below market value or nil compensation in those cases in which 
the purpose of the expropriation is land reform. In addition, the purpose of this chapter is to identify 
the manner in which compensation below market value may be determined as well as the circumstances 
in which nil compensation may be awarded. 
 
6.2. Amending the Constitution 
 
In light of the case law discussed in this dissertation, the following points may be made: 
 
First, the two-stage approach adopted by the courts to determine just and equitable compensation is 
contentious. This is because it is based on the arguments that market value is an objective factor and 
that none of the other factors are objective. Both of these arguments are wrong. In addition, the two-
stage approach is also contentious because it tends to favour market value over the other section 25(3) 
factors. In some cases, the courts have simply ignored the other section 25(3) factors and in other cases 
they have attached very little weight to them. They have also placed the onus on the land reform 
claimants to prove them. 
 
Second, even in those cases in which the courts have taken the other section 25(3) factors into account, 
they have misinterpreted them and, in particular, they have misinterpreted the purpose of the 
expropriation factor (paragraph (e)). Insofar as this factor is concerned, the courts have classified 
ordinary, run-of-the-mill expropriations as constitutionally special and have awarded compensation 
below market value. This has prejudiced private land owners by imposing an unfair burden on them. 
At the same time, they have also refused to classify land reform expropriations as constitutionally 
special and have awarded compensation at market value. This has prejudiced the public interest in land 




Third, the section 25(3) jurisprudence reached a particularly low point in Uys NO v Msiza where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, not only rejected the argument that land reform is constitutionally special, 
but appear to ignore all of the other section 25(3) factors in favour of market value. In addition, it 
abdicated its responsibility to determine just and equitable compensation to an expert valuer. As 
Ngcukaitobi and Bishop have pointed out, there are two related errors in the Court’s reasoning.178 First, 
the Constitution expressly requires all of the section 25(3) factors to be considered, despite knowing 
that ‘some of them would obviously be relevant in the determination of market value”. Second, the 
“weight of the various factors must be weighed by the court when it determines what is just and 
equitable, not by the valuer when she determines market value. Even if the same factors are considered, 
the purpose is different, as is the entity determining the weight.”179 
 
An important consequence of this disappointing jurisprudence is that it raises real doubts as to whether 
the courts will ever interpret section 25(3) of the Constitution in a manner that recognizes land reform 
as a constitutionally special purpose which may/should be awarded compensation at below market 
value or nil compensation. If the courts cannot be relied to interpret section 25(3) in this manner, and 
it seems that they cannot, then it follows that the only way to ensure that land reform is recognized as 
a constitutionally special purpose is for Parliament to intervene and amend section 25 of the 
Constitution to give effect to this interpretation of section 25(3).  
 
As pointed out in Chapter One, the Constitutional Review Committee has recommended that section 
25 of the Constitution should be amended to explicitly provide for expropriation without compensation 
as a legitimate option for land reform and the Ad Hoc Committee to Amend Section 25 of the 
Constitution has published a draft Bill amending section 25 of the Constitution to explicitly provide 
for nil compensation where the purpose is land reform. A discussion of this draft Bill, however, falls 
outside the scope of this dissertation.180 
 
 
178 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
179 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 10. 
180  For an insightful and thought-provoking analysis of the draft Bill see T Ngcukaitobi “What section 25 means for land 
reform” 13 December Mail and Guardian 29. 
47 
 




If we accept that land reform is a constitutionally special purpose which may/should be awarded 
compensation below market value or nil compensation, then two further questions arise: first, in how 
should compensation below market value be determined; and second, in which circumstances may nil 
compensation be awarded. Both of these questions have been addressed by Ngcukaitobi and Bishop in 
their paper entitled “The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”.181 
 
Insofar as the first question is concerned, Ngcukaitobi and Bishop argue that there are a variety of ways 
in which compensation below market value may be determined. Among these are the following: 
 
• First, the amount of compensation could be determined by a state valuer acting within a set 
clear guideline which indicate how much weight should be attached to each of the factors set 
out in section 25(3) in different contexts. 
 
• Second, the amount of compensation could be determined either by reducing the market value 
of the land by a particular percentage, for example 50% of the market value, or by basing the 
amount of compensation on the municipal valuation of the land. 
 
• Third, the amount of compensation could be determined by identifying the original purchase 
price and then simply adjusting it for inflation. This approach has already been adopted by the 




181 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019. 
182 2014 (6) SA 456 (CC). See also Jacobs (In re: The farm Uap) v Department of Land Affairs; Jacobs (In re: Erf 38) v 
Department of Land Affairs [2019] ZASCA 122 (26 September 2019). 
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• Last, the amount of compensation could be based simply on a flat rate per hectare, which is 
predetermined for different parts of the country and different types of land.183 
 
Ngcukaitobi and Bishop do not prefer one method over the others. They argue that whichever method 
is chosen it must balance the following concerns: “efficiency and cost of calculation, the amounts the 
method will generate, the flexibility, and the likelihood that it could be defended against constitutional 
attack and it must also be subject to judicial review.”184  
 
Insofar as the second question is concerned, Ngcukaitobi and Bishop argue that there are four possible 
circumstances where nil compensation may be awarded. These are as follows: 
• where the land is abandoned or unused; 
• where the land is held for speculative purposes; 
• where the land is under-utilized land and owned by public entities, and 
• where the land which is farmed by labour tenants and the title deed holder is absent.185   
 
Nil compensation is justified in these four circumstances, they argue further, for two reasons. First, 
“there is no emotional connection to the land in any of [these circumstances].  The owner will suffer, 
at worst, pure economic loss.  In some situations, there will be little or no loss at all.”186 Second, “the 
land is not being used productively. The justification for land reform is both to redress historic wrongs, 
but also to ensure that access to land is equitable. Allowing land to be unutilised, while others are 
landless – even if it is not subject to a specific restitution or labour tenant claim – does not promote 
equitable access to land”.187    
 
183 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 21-22. 
184 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 21-22. 
185 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 20. 
186 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.wits.ac.za/law/constitutional-court-review-conference/, accessed on 20 December 2019 at 20. 
187 T Ngcukaitobi and M Bishop The constitutionality of expropriation without compensation”, paper present at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference, held at the Old Fort, Constitutional Hill, 2-3 August 2018. Available at: 




It is interesting to note, that some of the circumstances identified by Ngcukaitobi and Bishop overlap 
with those identified by the drafters of the 2019 draft Expropriation Bill.188  
 
6.3.2 The 2019 Expropriation Bill 
 
(a) Introduction 
As a part of the process of amending section 25 of the Constitution to provide for nil compensation in 
those cases in which the purpose of the expropriation is land reform, the Minister of Public Works also 
published a draft Expropriation Bill in 2019. The purpose of this draft Bill is, inter alia, to give effect 
to the proposed constitutional amendment by identifying in more detail the circumstances in which nil 
compensation may be awarded. These circumstances are set out in clause 12(3) of the draft Bill. 
 
(b) Nil compensation 
Clause 12(3) of the draft Bill identifies five circumstances in which nil compensation may be awarded. 
It provides in this respect as follows: 
 
“It may be just and equitable for nil compensation to be paid where land is expropriated in the public interest, having regard 
to all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to:  
(a)  where the land is occupied or used by a labour tenant, as defined in the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 1996 
(Act No. 3 of 1996);  
(b)  where the land is held for purely speculative purposes;  
(c)  where the land is owned by a state-owned corporation or other state-owned entity;  
(d)  where the owner of the land has abandoned the land;  
(e)  where the market value of the land is equivalent to, or less than, the present value of direct state investment or 






188 Expropriation Bill B of 2015.  




A number of points may be made in respect of the provisions of clause 12(3) of the draft Bill. Among 
these are the following: 
 
First, clause 12(3) refers to those cases in which land is expropriated in the “public interest” rather than 
to those in which land is expropriated for ‘land reform’ purposes. While the public interest does 
encompass land reform, the clause fails to indicate clearly that land reform is a constitutionally special 
purpose. 
 
Second, the circumstances set out in clause 12(3) may be divided into three groups. First, those that 
focus on the current use of the property (paragraph (a) and (b)); second those that focus on the market 
value and extent of direct state investment in the property (paragraph (e)); and those that focus on the 
ownership of the land (paragraphs (c) and (d)).  
 
Third, while paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) seem to fall within the factors expressly listed in section 25(3) 
of the Constitution, paragraphs (c) and (d) seem to fall outside the factors listed in section 25(3). 
Although this does not make it unconstitutional, clause 12(3) seems to have a wider scope than section 
25(3). In addition, paragraph (d) is also a bit confusing. This is because some courts have held that 
abandoned land belongs the state. 
 
Fourth, clause 12(3) of the draft Bill can assist government in placing homeless people in the 
abandoned buildings in the cities although the draft Bill does not mention abandoned buildings, 
government can argue that it is in the public interest to do so and the draft Bill is clear that factors 
listed in clause 12(3) are not limited. However, in the rural areas where there are absent landowners 
who have since abandoned their land and left the tenants there, government can expropriate such land 
for public interest in terms of clause 12(3). 
 
Fifth, although nil compensation can be classified as a compensatory discount, it is the most extreme 
form of discount. Apart from this extreme compensatory discount, clause 12(3) does not provide for 
 
190 In most of these comments I am indebted to the discussion we had with Prof Warren Freedman. 
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the sorts of less extreme compensatory discounts that Zimmerman191 suggested. An important 
consequence of this failure is that compensatory discounts will be applied only in extreme cases, which 
will be few and far between. If clause 12(3) provided for less extreme compensatory discounts they 
would probably be used more frequently and thus have a bigger impact. 
 
Last, apart from amending the Constitution to expressly provide that land reform is constitutionally 
special and consequently that compensation may be below market value or nil, either the   Constitution 
or the Expropriation Act should be amended to provide for a new method of calculating compensation. 
As both Zimmerman and Du Plessis suggested, it should not be left to the courts. This will give 
flexibility to the courts to determine compensation on case by case basis. also, the courts must be 




This study has shown that courts are against two stage approach or centrality of the market value 
theoretically but most of the judgements seem to regard that market value is more important than other 
section 25(3) factors of the Constitution. Therefore, this confirms that it may be perceived that courts 
are biased towards market value when determining just and equitable compensation. Although there is 
a school of thought that argues that courts do not venerate the market value above other factors but 
they use market value as an entry point where justice and equity are encapsulated in the consideration 
of other factors. Therefore, they (the proponents of that school of thought) warn us not to misconstrue 
the two-stage approach as a tool that glorifies the centrality of market value above other listed and 
unlisted factors of section 25(3), but must be viewed as a pragmatic entry point where justice and 
equity are subsumed. 
 
I argue that the approach of the courts has unintentionally perpetuated the importance of market value 
sometimes at the expense of other consideration of section 25(3) factors or “factors of justice and 
 
191 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 407. 
192 J Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 2005 SALJ 
378 at 418 
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equity,”193  as Langa CJ held in minority judgement of Du Toit case. This view was also emphasized 
by the Panel of Expert’s report where the experts acknowledged that section 25 of the constitution in 
its current form is “compensation-centric and focused.”  This uncontested Msiza precedence 
impoverished our jurisprudence in ensuring that land reforms as the constitutional imperative are 
realised. I also agree with the view that our courts and academics are starting to acknowledge the 
importance of other factors beyond market value and there is a shift to this direction. 
 
To this end, the following recommendations may be made: 
 
 First, it appears that the issue of compensation is constitutional important, this begs the commitment 
from all law makers to deal with this issue constructively and ensure that compensation value reflects 
the flexibility of also allowing payment of compensation below market value in certain instances. To 
this end, law makers must legislate unambiguous, comprehensive and clear framework of 
expropriation laws where courts can easily interpret the content of section 25(3) of the Constitution.   
 
Second, public interest is often compromised by the preoccupation of establishing market value first 
before applying other section 25(3) to determine whether to increase or reduce the amount of 
compensation, this must be avoided and all factors be considered equally. 
 
Third, there is a need for constitutional amendment of section 25(3) in that, the approach adopted in 
Uys NO v Msiza suggests that the courts are reluctant to accept that land reform is constitutionally 
special and, consequently, that compensation may/should be below market value or nil. It follows, 
therefore, that the Constitution should be amended to expressly provide for such an approach. 
 
Fourth, the new Expropriation Act must clearly state the definition of just and equitable compensation 
and contain possible formulae to calculate just and equitable compensation; 
 
Fifth, the judiciary should treat expropriation cases as hard cases and resolve them in accordance with 
the Constitution and law. This will include developing common law before them so as to promote the 
values of the constitution as a whole. 
 




Sixth, the application of two stage approach must not be applied as the means to an end rather, it must 
be applied as an entry point which will encapsulate justice and equity. 
 
Seventh, section 25(3) must always be interpreted purposively and generously with an objective “of 
healing the division of the past and establishing a society based on democratic values, social justice 




The thesis endeavored to highlight the manner in which courts have interpreted section 25(3) of the 
constitution. It contended that although the courts have rejected that market value is a central factor in 
the calculation of just and equitable compensation, however, the majority of judgements that were 
discussed, applied market value as an entry point, thus making it central. This is an indication that 
lawmakers must assist courts by crafting legislation that will explicitly provide for circumstances that 
nil compensation or below market value compensation must apply. 
 
The question that is posed by this thesis can thus be answered by noting that courts have not been asked 
to interpret what is meant by just and equitable compensation. Also, in the interpretation of section 
25(3) of the Constitution, the courts were somehow restrained by implicit terms of section 25(3), thus 
moving slowly towards pushing the compensation payment below market value, these developments 
are indicating that there is no possibility of zero compensation or compensation in kind in the current 
constitutional framework. Notwithstanding the SCA Msiza case, in my view this case sharpens the 
debate and offers an opportunity to ponder deeply about the country’s commitment to heal the divisions 
of the past. 
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